Breaking Up Is Hard To Do

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In the latest saga of bond insurers’ problem, Bloomberg reports that “Bond Insurer Split May Trigger Lawsuits:”

Regulators’ plans to break up bond insurers into “good” businesses covering municipal debt and “bad” businesses liable to subprime-related losses may trigger “years of litigation,” Bank of America Corp. analysts said.

New York Insurance Department Superintendent Eric Dinallo and New York Governor Eliot Spitzer said last week that insurers may need to be divided if they can’t raise enough capital to compensate for losses on subprime-mortgage guarantees. FGIC Corp., the fourth-largest of the so-called monoline insurers, asked to be split on Feb. 15 after Moody’s Investors Service cut the Stamford, Connecticut-based company’s top Aaa ranking.

“It is the equivalent of going to a casino and trying to keep only the winning bets,” said Tim Mercer, chief investment officer at Hong Kong-based hedge fund Musashi Capital Ltd. “This would be a straightforward case of fraudulent conveyance and everyone involved would be liable for damages from deprived creditors.”

FGIC, owned by Blackstone Group LP and PMI Group Inc., insures about $314 billion of debt, including $220 billion in municipal bonds. The company said last week it applied for a license from New York state insurance regulators to create a standalone municipal company and separate the unit that guarantees subprime-mortgage bonds and related securities that led to rating downgrades.

New York-based Ambac Financial Group Inc., the second- largest bond insurer, may also seek a split, the Wall Street Journal reported today, citing a person familiar with the situation.

Not being an attorney, I certainly can’t comment on the legalities of such a break up. However, it sounds like a desperate attempt to keep a sinking ship afloat. I agree that a split would create a ‘good’ company and a ‘bad’ one.

It would appear that years of legal entanglement will be a sure thing, so why prolong the inevitable? If a company can not do business based on its model, has made grave mistakes or the model has become flawed, a natural conclusion might be that it should become road kill.

Have We Reached Bottom?

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Based on the amount of reader e-mails I have received, I am amazed about how many investors are in hot pursuit of trying to pick a bottom in certain beaten down ETFs. Others are using an assortment of analysts and TV gurus to confirm their uncontrollable desires to enter the market and, hopefully, pick a declining investment (a loser) on the theory that once they made the purchase the downtrend is sure to reverse.

From my viewpoint as a trend tracker, both of those approaches, buying losers and listening to analysts, have no merit whatsoever. To make this more understandable, maybe I need to inject some sense of humor by quoting someone who has an opinion on the subject. Back in 2002, humorist Dave Barry said the following:

Enron stock was rated as “Can’t Miss” until it became clear that the company was in desperate trouble, at which point analysts lowered the rating to “Sure Thing.” Only when Enron went completely under did a few bold analysts demote its stock to the lowest possible Wall Street analyst rating, “Hot Buy.”

There is a lesson in this and it is this: Don’t go long when the trend is down and don’t enter into short positions when the trend is up. It’s not difficult yet so hard to do for many who are itching to do something—anything.

Next time, the desire to act tries to overcome your rational judgment, keep in mind that the safest strategy in this uncertain environment is to stand aside and wait for better conditions.

Sunday Musings: It’s Not About You

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No matter where you look, and which online news service you scan, you are bombarded with stats about the declining housing market and the daily increase in the number of homes entering foreclosure. It’s not only happening in the bubble states (California, Nevada, Arizona, Florida) but nationwide as well.

Calculated Risk featured an update story on the subject in Georgia, while Mish over at Global Economic Trend Analysis reviewed Maryland, Virginia and D.C. housing issues.

No doubt, you have heard about the major efforts by banks and mortgage companies with the blessing of the U.S. government to freeze the foreclosure process for 30 days and/or renegotiate acceptable loan terms with individual borrowers. With some 2.4 million mortgages resetting over the next couple of years, this amounts to a Herculean effort.

If you have gotten the impression that the main purpose of this mission is to rescue homeowners, then you are mistaken. Yes, some borrowers will be helped, many will not. The main purpose is to rescue the banks/lenders from drowning in foreclosed properties. Anytime a lender takes back a home in today’s market, it’s a losing proposition.

Let’s take a simplified example in which I am the lender and you are the borrower. Let’s assume that I made a loan on your home a few years ago for $400k. Your home is currently worth only $300k, which means you are unable to refinance or sell without adding any cash of your own. Note, that this loan was made as a ‘qualified’ loan and not of the Subprime variety but that you are facing a resetting of the adjustable payment.

As many homeowners in this situation, walking away sounds like a plausible solution as you recognize that your choices are limited. You contact me to inform me to ask as to where to send the key to the home as you will be vacating.

Since I have just taken back a few other houses, I don’t really want to end up with another headache. Right now, your loan is an income producing asset on my balance sheet. If you stop payments, this turns into a liability for me, since I borrowed the original funds from an investor to whom I am obligated for the term of the loan.

My goal now is to find out what you can afford to pay and get you to keep on paying it. The old payment was comfortable and you might like my proposal of keeping that intact by me giving you a 2-year extension. What’s the benefit to you other than that you get to remain in the house? None, really, but look at what I as the lender gained:

1. I am still collecting a payment, although lower, on an overvalued asset

2. I don’t have to foreclose, which takes at least 120 days, during which I would not receive payments

3. Once I own the property, I will have to aggressively market it to hopefully sell it at $300k

4. If I finally sell it at $300k, I will have selling expenses of some $23k, netting me only $277k

5. During the marketing and escrow period, I will not collect any interest payments either

6. When all is said and done, my original $400k loan returns to me some $277k at best not counting lost interest payments and fix up costs

As you can see from this small example, negotiating with borrowers to keep them paying on an over inflated asset will do nothing for them, but will do everything for me as the lender.

If you think all these re-negotiation efforts are about helping you as the borrower, think again. It’s not about you; it’s about saving lending institutions that will have to write down assets so fast when considering REOs (Real Estate Owned) in huge numbers, that the liability column on their balance sheets may grow to be larger than the asset side. That, of course, would mean another bank bites the dust.

Even if you extend the same loan terms to troubled borrowers by 2 years, or freeze foreclosure proceedings by 30 days, it will only delay not solve the moment of reckoning.

From my point of view, there are only 2 solutions to this problem. Bring back the garbage loans with low initial payments or give every borrower in distress a $100k/year raise. Yeah right, either one of those are likely to happen.

How Credit Default Swaps Work

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One of the many terms you’ve been reading about is Credit Default Swaps (CDS). They represent a market that is currently valued at some $50 trillion (yes, trillion, not billion) and can, given today’s counter party risk, which I alluded to in a recent post, affect the markets very negatively given the right circumstances.

So what on earth are CDSs and how do they work? Minyanville had this explanation:

The CDS is economically similar to credit insurance. The buyer of protection (typically a bank) transfers the risk of default of a borrower (the reference entity) to a protection seller who, for a fee, indemnifies the protection buyer against credit losses. The CDS market has grown exponentially to current outstandings of around $50 trillion. Even eliminating double counting in the volumes, the figures are impressive, especially when you considered that the market was less than $1 trillion as of 2001. However, the size of the market (which has attracted much attention) is not the major issue.

Banks have used CDS contracts extensively to hedge credit risk on bonds and loans. Documentation and counterparty risk means that the market may not function as participants and regulators hope when actual defaults occur.

CDS documentation is highly standardized to facilitate trading. It generally does not exactly match the terms of the underlying risk being hedged. CDS contracts are technically complex in relation to the identity of the entity being hedged, the events that are covered and how the CDS contract is to be settled. This means that the hedge may not provide the protection sought. In fairness, all financial hedges display some degree of mismatch or “basis” risk.

The CDS contract is triggered by a “credit event”, broadly default by the reference entity. The buyer of protection is not protected against “all” defaults. They are only protected against defaults on a specified set of obligations in certain currencies. It is possible that there is a loan default but technical difficulties may make it difficult to trigger the CDS hedging that loan. Some credit events like “restructuring” are complex. There are different versions – R (restructuring), NR (no restructuring), MR (modified restructuring) and MMR (modified modified restructuring). Different contracts use different versions.

“PAI” (publicly available information) must generally be used to trigger the CDS contract. Recent credit events have been straightforward Chapter 11 filings and bankruptcy. For other credit events (failure to pay or restructuring), there may be problems in establishing that the credit event took place.

This has a systemic dimension. A CDS protection buyer may have to put the reference entity into bankruptcy or Chapter 11 in order to be able to settle the contract. A study by academics Henry Hu and Bernard Black (from the University of Texas) concludes that CDS contracts may create incentives for creditors to push troubled companies into bankruptcy. This may exacerbate losses in the case of defaults.

In the case of default, the protection buyer in CDS must deliver a defaulted bond or loan – the deliverable obligation – to the protection seller in return for receiving the face value of the delivered item (known as physical settlement). When Delphi defaulted, the volume of CDS outstanding was estimated at $28 billion against $5.2 billion of bonds and loans (not all of qualified for delivery). On actively traded names CDS volumes are substantially greater than outstanding debt making it difficult to settle contracts.

Shortage of deliverable items and practical restrictions on settling CDS contracts has forced the use of “protocols” – where any two counterparties, by mutual consent, substitute cash settlement for physical delivery. In cash settlement, the seller of protection makes a payment to the buyer of protection. The payment is intended to cover the loss suffered by the protection buyer based on the market price of defaulted bonds established through a so-called “auction system”. The auction is designed to be robust and free of the risk of manipulation.

In Delphi, the protocol resulted in a settlement price of 63.38% (the market estimate of recovery by the lender). The protection buyer received 36.62% (100%-63.38%) or $3.662 million per $10 million CDS contract. Fitch Ratings assigned a R6 recovery rating to Delphi’s senior unsecured obligation equating to a 0-10% recovery band – far below the price established through the protocol [see James Batterman and Eric Rosenthal Special Report: Delphi, Credit Derivatives, and Bond Trading Behavior After a Bankruptcy Filing (28 November 2005); www.fitchratings.com].

The buyer of protection, depending on what was being hedged, may have potentially received a payment on its hedge well below its actual losses – effectively it would not have been fully hedged.

The settlement mechanics may cause problems even where there is no default. One company refinanced its debt using commercial mortgage backed securities (“CMBS”). The company was downgraded by rating agencies. A shortage of deliverable obligations (the company used the funds from the CMBS to repay its bond and loans) meant that the CDS fee for the company fell sharply (indicative of an improvement in credit quality). This resulted in mark-to-market losses for bemused hedgers. This is known in the trade as an “orphaned CDS”.

In the case of actual defaults the CDS market may provide significant employment to a whole galaxy of lawyers trying to figure out whether and how the contract should work. There is the risk that contract may not always provide buyers of protection with the hedge against loss that they assumed they would receive.

To me, it’s a huge pyramid game that totally depends on the opposing parties making good on their promises to cover their end of the bargain. What is unknown is how many parties to these contracts will actually be able to fulfill their obligations given the current credit mess and the fact that many participants are capital impaired.

I have no idea how this will play out, but it would seem that if only 5% of these “bets” go bad, that will be $2.5 trillion worth of “transaction” that have to be covered somehow. It will take only one Black Swan event, such as a major bank failure, to get the ball rolling and push the economy into unchartered territory with unknown consequences.

I am not trying to be negative here, just realistic. We’ve witnessed the quick unraveling of the subprime/housing market and its effect on the credit markets with many banks struggling to raise capital to stay afloat. That result was caused by negative numbers in the billions; what if there are trillions involved?

No Load Fund/ETF Tracker updated through 2/14/2008

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My latest No Load Fund/ETF Tracker has been posted at:

http://www.successful-investment.com/newsletter-archive.php

Mixed economic reports had the bulls and bears engaged in a tug-of-war all week.

Our Trend Tracking Index (TTI) for domestic funds/ETFs remained -0.86% below its long-term trend line (red), in bearish territory.




The international index dropped to -7.42% below its own trend line, keeping us in a sell mode for that arena as well.



For more details, and the latest market commentary, as well as the updated No load Fund/ETF StatSheet, please see the above link.

Money Market Fund Update

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In a recent post, I warned about the dangers of chasing high money market yields. Kevin Depew at Minyanville had this to say in item #3 of his “Five Things You Need To Know:

This morning on its earnings conference call Panera Bread (PNRA) was forced to detail why the company had to write down $1 million due to a short-term investment in the Columbia Strategic Cash Portfolio, an enhanced money market fund through Bank of America (BAC) that we wrote about in Five Things back in early December.

Since 2004 Panera has held an operating cash level of $10 to $15 million in a cash reserves fund, a traditional money market fund. Amounts above that threshold the company held in the Columbia Strategic Cash Portfolio.

According to PNRA CFO Jeffery Kip, in November of last year the company had $26.5 million in the Columbia fund – more than 75% what PNRA says is the maximum balance kept in the traditional money market fund, which to me seems like a lot of risk for a few extra basis points – and asked BAC to remove the funds, but were not allowed to do so. Shortly thereafter, of course, we learned that BAC and Columbia had frozen the fund to redemptions.

OK, so we’re almost halfway into February and PNRA is now writing down $1 million. Time to move on, right? Not exactly. Since November, PNRA has withdrawn approximately $8.2 million from the fund, which according to Kip is 98.7 cents on the dollar. They still have $18.2 million in the fund, which is still more than 20% of the max value the company keeps in traditional money market funds.

Meanwhile, PNRA is valuing its investment in the fund at about 96 cents on the dollar, but how? According to the company, this valuation is based on direct market quotes, valuations from Interactive Data Corp., the ratings agencies, and the company’s assumption that anything in the fund with lower than an A rating (approximately 6% of the holdings) returns an average of 40%.

We’re not so sure this is the end of the story.

Again, the danger of trying to squeeze an extra percentage point or so out of a money market fund can prove to be a risky proposition. Breaking the buck can happen with any high yielding money fund given the lingering credit crisis. Even if I sound like a broken record, you’re better off rather being safe than sorry by keeping your idle funds in a U.S. treasury only money market fund. Check with your custodian as to the choices they are offering.

Market Comment: The markets ended higher yesterday on not great, but better than feared, retail sales data. Our Domestic Trend Tracking Index (TTI) barely crossed its long-term trend line to the upside by a scant +0.11%. Since our domestic sell signal on 1/18/2008, the TTI has been bouncing slightly above and below the dividing line between bull and bear territory. We need to see a clear break in one direction or another before taking any positions.